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Abstract 
 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court relaxed the ability of corporations to spend money 
on elections, rejecting a shareholder-protection rationale for restrictions on spending.  
Little research has focused on the relationship between corporate governance – 
shareholder rights and power – and corporate political activity.  This paper explores that 
relationship in the S&P 500 to predict the effect of Citizens United on shareholder 
wealth. The paper finds that in the period 1998-2004 shareholder-friendly governance 
was consistently and strongly negatively related to observable political activity before 
and after controlling for established correlates of that activity, even in a firm fixed effects 
model.  Political activity, in turn, is strongly negatively correlated with firm value.  These 
findings – together with the likelihood that unobservable political activity is even more 
harmful to shareholder interests – imply that laws that replace the shareholder protections 
removed by Citizens United would be valuable to shareholders.   
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Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: 
What Effect will Citizens United have on Shareholder Wealth
*
 
 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court relaxed the ability of corporations to spend money 
on elections, and in so doing, it rejected a shareholder-protection rationale for restrictions 
on spending, in part on the ground that shareholders are generally capable of defending 
their own interests through ―corporate democracy.‖1  Another possible (but unstated) 
reason for the Court’s rejection of shareholder protection as a basis for restrictions on the 
political activities of corporations is that there has been surprisingly little research 
focused on the relationship between corporate governance – shareholder rights and power 
– and corporate political activity.  This paper explores that relationship in the S&P 500 to 
predict the effect of Citizens United on shareholder wealth.  
 
The paper finds that in the period 1998-2004 shareholder-friendly governance was 
consistently and strongly negatively related to observable political activity before and 
after controlling for established correlates of that activity, even in a firm fixed effects 
model.  Political activity, in turn, is strongly negatively correlated with firm value.  These 
findings – together with the likelihood that unobservable political activity is even more 
harmful to shareholder interests – imply that laws that replace the shareholder protections 
removed by Citizens United would be valuable to shareholders.  If as seems likely 
Congress eventually enacts legislation responding to Citizens United, or otherwise 
attempting to protect shareholders in the corporate political sphere, the evidence 
presented here should help demonstrate that such legislation serves as a legitimate and 
compelling purpose separate from the anti-corruption and other purposes that have 
traditionally justified campaign finance laws.   
 
Part I briefly (a) describes the US Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, and 
(b) reviews relevant literatures on (1) corporate governance and its relationship to 
shareholder wealth, and (2) corporate political activity.  Part II develops hypotheses to be 
tested, and describes the data used to test the hypotheses.  Part III summarizes data on 
corporate governance, corporate political activity, and shareholder wealth.  Part IV relates 
the data on corporate political activity to the data on corporate governance.  Univariate 
and multivariate results are presented, and the robustness of the findings is tested with 
alternative specifications.  The paper then briefly concludes with implications for law and 
policy. 
                                                 
*
 I extend thanks for comments and discussions to Dick Fallon, Frank Michelman, Rick Pildes, Jesse Fried, 
Heather Gerken, and participants in the Harvard Law School Faculty Workshop and ... [other commenters].  
Jin-Hyuk Kim graciously provided data on corporate political activity.  All rights reserved.   
1
 558 U.S. __ (2010) at 46 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 794 & n. 34).  The Court also asserted that the 
laws at issue in the case were poorly tailored to the goal of shareholder protection.  For a critique of the 
Court’s legal and institutional analysis on that and other points, see Coates 2010. 
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1. Prior Literatures 
 
1.1. Citizens United 
 
In Citizens United, the US Supreme Court decided that long-standing laws barring 
corporations (and unions) from making independent political expenditures were 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  Those laws effectively constrained 
corporations from actively campaigning on behalf of politicians in the period from World 
War II through 2010, greatly curtailed the amount of money that corporations could 
spend even indirectly on election activity, and reduced (though they did not eliminate) the 
ability of corporations to influence campaigns through contributions.  Corporations have 
been permitted to establish and pay the expenses of political action committees (PACs) 
but may not donate corporate funds to those PACs, which must instead solicit donations 
from corporate managers, employees and shareholders.  While those laws have not 
constrained lobbying – that is, efforts to present information and otherwise persuade 
lawmakers, once elected, to pursue particular policies – they have limited the ability of 
corporations to influence the choice of lawmakers by voters, and (since lawmaker time 
and attention is a limited resource) limited the effectiveness of past lobbying efforts.  As 
discussed below, the complementary relationship between lobbying and election 
activities are established in the literature on corporate political activity.  The clear 
implication is that Citizens United can be expected to increase all kinds of political 
activity by corporations.   
 
If corporate managers could be trusted to spend corporate money on political activity that 
would benefit shareholders, then this relaxation in the constraints on corporate political 
activity might still be of concern to voters generally worried about the disproportionate 
power that the concentrated wealth represented by the largest corporations and its effect 
on government policy.  Rent seeking of a sort beneficial to shareholders might be harmful 
to taxpayers or consumers, for example.  But at least one would not worry about any 
additional burden of such activity on capital formation or the economic benefits that flow 
from well-governed public companies.  Unfortunately, existing research establishes 
beyond doubt that, at least at a large number of public companies, managers cannot be 
trusted with other people’s money, and that observable corporate governance provisions 
consistently predict the degree to which faithless managers divert shareholder wealth for 
their own ends, destroy corporate wealth, and reduce public welfare. 
 
1.2. Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance literature is vast, multidisciplinary and yet largely siloed – that is, 
articles in accounting journals cite other articles in accounting journals; articles in finance 
journals cite other finance articles; law review cite law reviews, and so forth, even when 
addressing topics related or even identical to those addressed in other disciplines.  For 
surveys, see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny 1997 and Bischoff 2009.  But few strands 
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of this literature have touched on corporate political activity (CPA).
2
  Bischoff 2009 
reviews 141 corporate governance articles published 1997 to 2009 and finds none 
focused on CPA. Instead, its focus has tended to be agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 
1976):  to what extent and how corporate managers (or dominant shareholders) act in 
ways that harm or fail to benefit shareholders (or minority shareholders), and to what 
extent and how contracts (for example, stock options), transactions (for example, hostile 
takeovers, buyouts), institutions (for example, boards, institutional investors, stock 
exchanges), or regulations (for example, Sarbanes-Oxley) can efficiently constrain 
agency costs.  For example, Berle and Means 1932 posited that shareholder dispersion 
would increase managerial slack, enabling managers to obtain greater private benefits.  
Jensen and Murphy 1990 argued that increasing manager ownership (particularly 
through stock options) would align manager and shareholder interests.  Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997 suggest that large blockholders can reduce managerial agency costs (albeit 
with the risk that they may create conflicts among shareholders), although other studies 
question this claim (for example, Ryan and Schneider 2002, Hendry 2006).   
 
Gompers et al. 2003 show that firm-specific shareholder-friendly corporate governance 
provisions – found in corporate charters, bylaws, and executive contracts – correlate 
positively with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted book/price ratios
3
), 
operating performance, and shareholder returns.
4
  Bebchuk et al. 2009 show a similar set 
of correlations with a simpler index that is better grounded on theories relating corporate 
governance provisions to mechanism of corporate control, as first analyzed in Coates 
2000.  Bebchuk and Cohen 2005 and Faleye 2007 show a similar correlation between 
corporate value and what is arguably the most important corporate governance provision 
– the presence or absence of a classified board, which imposes delay on the ability of 
shareholders to remove a majority of directors.  Such a correlation can be partly 
explained by the effect that classified boards have on hostile takeovers, as shown by 
                                                 
2
 There are lines of corporate governance research that argue that ownership and control structures emerge 
in response to political pressures, or vice versa.  For example, Roe 1994 argues that important features of 
US corporate governance result from general political suspicion of concentrated power; Roe 2003 argues 
that variation in ownership structures at large companies is explained by varying political pressure for 
redistribution; Morck et al. 2005, argue that corporate governance structures can result in high 
concentrations of corporate power in small elites, which in turn can result in socially harmful political and 
economic outcomes. But these lines of research generally take individual nations as units of analysis and do 
not attempt to explain or draw lessons from variation in corporate governance or CPA within a country.  
3
 More precisely value is measured by a ratio somewhat misleadingly referred to as ―Tobin’s Q,‖ which 
following Kaplan and Zingales 1997 is calculated as [BVA+MVCE-BVCE-DT] / BVA, where BVA is 
book value of assets, MVCE is current common stock market capitalization – that is, stock prices – BVCE 
is book value of common equity, which is typically a nominal value, and DT is the book value of deferred 
taxes.  The original idea of Tobin’s Q was to relate the market value of an asset to its replacement value, 
Tobin and Brainard 1977, but the market value of a firm’s assets are not readily observable. If book and 
market values for a firm’s assets diverge (as when a firm’s assets include significant intellectual property), 
the value as so measured will differ from true Q. 
4
 Core et al. 2006 confirm the finding of shareholder-friendly governance correlating with strong operating 
performance, but show that the finding of a correlation with shareholder returns was fragile and did not 
persist in the early 2000s, a change Bebchuk et al. 2010 confirm for the whole of the 2000s and attribute to 
investor learning.  However, Bebchuk et al. 2010 show the correlation between governance provisions and 
corporate value (measured by industry-adjusted book/price ratios) persisted in the 2000s. 
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Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian 2002, and first analyzed in Coates 2000.  Finally, a 
number of studies (for example, Bebchuk and Fried 2004) have suggested that higher 
CEO pay will be extracted from firms with weaker shareholder rights. 
 
All of these studies have potential endogeneity problems (for example, Listokin 2008).  it 
is not implausible that corporate governance provisions are adopted or modified over 
time in light of actual or expected corporate performance.  It is also likely that the models 
omit important unobservable causes of firm performance and value, and some of those 
omitted factors (for example, manager attitudes towards shareholders) may also be 
systematically correlated with governance terms.  For policy purposes, it also seems 
likely that optimal governance will vary across firms, and that the parameters reflected in 
these studies may differ from those for out-of-sample firms (and perhaps for a majority of 
public companies).  Still, these studies establish that governance provisions are reliable 
correlates of performance and value, and shift the burden of proof to those who believe 
that such provisions are epiphenomenal or derivative, and have no causal relationship 
with performance or value.   
 
Among the few corporate governance scholars to address CPA, Brudney 1981 defended 
restrictions on CPA from a shareholder perspective, noting that early US corporations 
were limited in their activities by charter restrictions that would effectively have 
forbidden CPA, and defending a rule requiring a supermajority of (or even unanimity 
among) shareholders under the First Amendment. Citizens United and potential 
legislative responses have stimulated a few corporate governance papers focusing on 
CPA Bebchuk et al. 2010 argue that public company shareholders are more vulnerable to 
managerial agency problems in the CPA context than in other contexts, and argue for 
new legislative default rules (which shareholders could opt out of) requiring disclosure 
and prior shareholder approval of CPA.  Gilson and Klausner 2010 worry that CPA risks 
involving public companies in polarizing debates and shareholder votes and argue for 
shareholder approval requirements so as to minimize the potential costs of such debates.   
 
1.3. Corporate Political Activity 
 
A smaller but still extensive literature in management, political science, and economics 
explores non-governance determinants of corporate political activity.  Hillman et al. 2004 
surveys articles in major scholarly journals 1995-2002 in strategic management, 
sociology, political science, economics, and finance on antecedents of CPA, and its 
effects on public policy and firm performance.
5
  They report that independent ongoing 
CPA in the US is more common for firms that are larger (for example, Hansen and 
Mitchell 2000), more dependent on government (for example, more sales to government, 
Hart 2001, or more exports, Schuler 1999), diversified (for example, more business lines, 
Brasher and Lowery 2006), older (where firm age is generally interpreted as a proxy for 
firm ―experience‖ or ―reputation,‖ for example, Baron 1995), and owned by US  (as 
opposed to foreign) shareholders (for example, Getz 1996).  Firms in concentrated 
                                                 
5 See also Potters and Sloof 1996, which surveys empirical studies in the public choice, economics, and 
political economy literatures on political activities of interest groups, including corporations. 
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industries tend to engage in more CPA (for example, Schuler et al. 2002),
6
 and as firms 
often match competitors’ contributions, CPA clusters by industry (for example, Grier et 
al. 1994). Brasher and Lowery 2006 find that US public companies are more likely to 
engage in lobbying than otherwise similar non-public US companies, a finding consistent 
with the general view from the corporate governance literature that managerial agency 
problems are more severe at public US companies than at non-public US companies, 
although this implication is not developed in that article. 
 
Ansolabehere et al. 2002 show a strong complementarity between types of CPA, with 
over 86% of all contributions coming from firms with both a lobbyist and PAC; see also 
Schuler et al. 2002 (firms tend to combine contributions and lobbying).  Contributions 
buy access, and lobbying exploits access to affect policy (see, for example, Wright 1990, 
Austen-Smith 1995, Tripathi et al. 2002). Kim 2008 compares determinants of 
contributions and of lobbying, and finds that empirical proxies for free riding and rent 
seeking correlate with both types of CPA, while financial distress correlates with 
lobbying, but not contributions.   
 
Many studies find evidence that interest groups exchange money and/or information for 
political benefits of various kinds, such as trade barriers (Goldberg and Maggi 1999), 
academic earmarks (de Figueiredo and Silverman 2006), reduced or easier regulatory 
inspections (Gordon and Hafer 2005), favorable rate regulation (Bonardi et al. 2006), and 
lower tax rates (Richter et al. 2009).  Humphries 1991 and Langbein 1986 provide some 
empirical evidence that contributions are indeed used to buy more contacts with 
politicians.  Researchers focusing on specific issues or industries have found evidence of 
influence via lobbying or other political activity (see, for example, Schuler 1996 (steel), 
Kroszner and Stratmann 1998 (financial services), and de Figueiredo and Tiller 2001 
(communications)).  Firms withhold contributions from officials who vote against their 
interests (see, for example, Jackson and Engel 2003 (China policy) and Franca (2001 
(NAFTA policy)).   
 
Event studies have revealed political influence on stock prices, and thus on firms. 
US equity markets are affected by the control of Congress (Jayachandran 2006) and 
policy platforms (Knight 2006); see also Fisman 2001 (Indonesian stock market). But 
these studies do not distinguish between policies (that may be adopted for public-
regarding reasons) and those adopted for the private benefit of companies, or in exchange 
for contributions or lobbying.  More recently, Cooper et al. 2010 find a positive 
correlation between corporate PAC contributions and subsequent abnormal stock returns 
and accounting earnings in the US, with the strongest effects for contributions to House 
Democrats, although they are not able to conclude the effect is causal.  Kim 2008 finds 
that lobbying expenditures increase a firm’s raw and market-adjusted (but not industry-
adjusted) equity returns in the following year.  While these findings are inconsistent with 
an extreme form of agency cost explanation of CPA – one in which CPA provides no 
benefits for companies and shareholders – they are not inconsistent with more 
                                                 
6
 Some studies find industry unionization increases corporate political activity, e.g., Mitchell et al. 1997, 
but others do not, e.g., Schuler et al. 2002. 
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conventional agency cost theories, in which managers attempt to pursue strategies for 
private reasons even when they are less than optimal for shareholders.    
 
Little prior work has focused on managerial agency costs as a potential cause of CPA. 
Some have theorized that ―slack‖ may determine CPA (for example, Yoffie 1987; 
Schuler, 1996; Schuler et al., 2002).  But what corporate governance researchers mean by 
―slack‖ – that is, the ability of managers to divert firm resources for non-shareholder-
oriented ends – differs from how ―slack‖ is used in the management literature, where it 
often means financial resources more generally (for example, firm size, debt-to-equity or 
current ratios, as in Schuler 1996, or free cash flow, as in Schuler et al. 2002), which 
might be more or less constrained regardless of whether managers are perfect agents for 
shareholders.  In any event, only firm size has been found to have a statistically 
significant relationship with CPA.  A few researchers have also focused on whether 
political activity of top managers predicts CPA, but this relatively uncommon work has 
focused on small companies (for example, Cook and Barry 1995), where alignment 
between ownership and management makes the correlation between manager and firm 
political activity unproblematic from a corporate governance perspective.
7
  Other work 
suggests that CPA represents a form of managerial ―consumption‖ good – consistent with 
the possibility that it is pursued at the expense of shareholders (see, for example, 
Ansolabehere et al. 2003, surveying numerous prior studies).  Even if CPA was a form of 
consumption for managers, however, CPA would not necessarily represent agency costs 
– CPA might represent a form of consumption for owner-managers even in companies 
with no separation of ownership and control, and be unaffected by corporate governance, 
or be offset in public companies by lower manager compensation. 
 
One study employs an empirical strategy akin to the one used in this paper (Kim 2008).
8
  
That study includes one governance variable (the ―g‖ index from Gompers et al. 2003) in 
modeling the determinants of CPA, as a proxy for managerial slack, and finds that (after 
controlling for other factors) weak shareholder rights (higher g’s) correlate positively 
with the propensity to lobby and to sponsor a PAC, and with lobbying expenditures, but 
not with PAC contribution levels.  Agency theory, however, was one of many theories 
tested, so the results on ―g‖ are not explored in detail or tested for robustness, and the 
expenditure and contribution results rely on fragile empirical specifications.
9
  This paper 
analyzes the relationship between corporate governance and CPA more intensively, 
                                                 
7
 Some work in sociology suggests managers are a (but not the sole) determinant of CPA.  Blumentritt 2003 
used survey data in a cross-country study of the CPA of foreign subsidiaries of US-based multinational 
companies, and found that subsidiary top manager beliefs about the value of investments in CPA were 
more important than firm size, technological development or access to export markets in predicting CPA, 
but the study did not test whether CPA in fact benefited shareholders.  With 1980 data, Burris 2001 found 
that firm contribution patterns differed significantly from contributions by firms’ top managers, but the 
study design did not allow examination whether differences in governance contributed to these differences. 
8
 The author of that study graciously shared his data, which is included in the sample tested below. 
9
 Specifically, lobbying expenditures and PAC contributions are estimated with Heckman two-stage 
selection models in which first- and second-stage regressors are identical (save for lambda in the second-
stage), so the system is identified – that is, observations vary – only by the non-linearity of lambda, and 
likely suffer from collinearity and produce fragile results.  Puhani 2000; Little and Rubin 1987.   
 7 
testing different samples and measures of governance, with additional sets of controls and 
empirical specifications, and produces findings that suggest that corporate governance 
and CPA (including PAC contribution levels) are even more tightly linked than suggested 
in Kim 2008.   
 
All empirical studies of CPA are challenged by the fact that only certain kinds of CPA 
are required to be disclosed, even by public companies.  If Exxon hires a registered 
lobbyist or lobbying firm to act as such, the lobbyist and/or firm must disclose that fact, 
but nothing requires Exxon to disclose the fact that it may hire a law firm (not registered 
as a lobbyist) that engages in activities that are essentially political in nature, and would 
be identified as ―lobbying‖ in ordinary speech.10  Books, television ads or appearances, 
op eds, pamphlets, Congressional testimony, efforts to stimulate ―grassroots‖ letter 
writing campaigns, and public comments on proposed regulations, and all lobbying 
activities by those whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of the time 
engaged in services are all arguably exempt from the legal definition of ―lobbying 
contacts,‖ depending on the facts.  Lobbying disclosure laws are also largely unenforced.  
More important, even contributions and election expenditures were exempt under the pre-
Citizens United disclosure regime if they were funneled through independent 
organizations.  While those organizations might have been subject to a disclosure 
requirement if they in turn made contributions or expenditures, there was nothing in the 
disclosure regime that would have required a public company that donated money to, for 
example, a commonly controlled but formally independent non-profit to disclose its 
donations to the non-profit, or to force the non-profit to disclose to the public the identity 
of its donors.   
 
As a result, the control and funding of many organizations active in politics was and 
remains a mystery.  Any research claiming to have assessed the aggregate amount of 
political activity by businesses or corporations should thus be viewed skeptically.   
Nevertheless, for purposes of this paper, the effect of there being potentially very large 
unobservable political activity by corporations is to make it harder for any negative 
relationship that might exist between corporate governance and corporate political 
activity to be detected.  If a negative relationship can be found based on observable data 
on CPA, then it is even more likely that this relationship is understated in the analysis, 
because (for obvious reasons) managers will be more likely to engage in non-
shareholder-wealth related CPA that is not observable, and more likely to engage in CPA 
that will create wealth for shareholders if it is observable.  (For the same reason, if a 
positive relationship can be found in existing data, one would worry that it simply 
follows from this example of the classic ―searching under the streetlights‖ problem.)   
  
                                                 
10
 See generally 2 USC § 1602 (definitions of lobbying activities and related terms). 
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2. Hypotheses and Samples 
 
2.1. Hypotheses 
 
The literature on corporate governance suggests that agency problems will tend to be 
more acute when shareholders are most dispersed, when managers have low ownership, 
when blockholders are not present, and when shareholder rights are weakest.  The 
literature on CPA suggests that CPA may represent a form of managerial perquisite – a 
―consumption good‖ for those who control the CPA – that is, managers.  CPA could 
represent, in this view, pursuit of a pet project that is at best unrelated to shareholder 
interests, and at worst could actively harm them.  Putting these points together suggests 
several straightforward hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  CPA will correlate positively with corporate governance measures –
 ownership dispersion, low insider ownership, low blockholder ownership, weaker 
shareholder rights, and higher CEO pay – even after controlling for other determinants of 
CPA. 
 
An alternative view of CPA, however, suggests that CPA can be value maximizing for 
shareholders.  CPA may produce rents for companies, or defend existing corporate 
strategies against rent seeking by competitors.  More generally, at most optimistically, 
CPA may produce public policy that is aligned with both public and shareholder interests, 
as when (for example) ―lobbying‖ activities – including the provision of true and useful 
information to elected officials – lead to a better fit between social welfare and 
regulations.  This alternative view leads to a set of alternative hypotheses: 
 
Alternative hypothesis 1b:  CPA should be uncorrelated with such factors, particularly 
after appropriately controlling for factors likely to determine the relationship between 
politics and corporate performance, such as industry, size, and firm age.   
 
Another possibility, not developed in the CPA literature, but implicit in the corporate 
governance literature, is that CPA requires additional managerial effort, or could expose 
managers to personal (political or reputational) risks.  If the effort required or the risks 
are different in kind from the effort or risks created by non-CPA manager roles, managers 
might avoid CPA even when doing so would benefit shareholders.  This leads to a second 
alternative hypothesis: 
 
Alternative hypothesis 1c:  CPA will be negatively correlated with corporate governance 
factors, even after controlling for known determinants of CPA. 
 
Finally, even if CPA represents a ―consumption‖ good for corporate managers, it might 
be optimal or at least neutral for shareholders if managers were willing to ―pay‖ for the 
right to cause companies to engage in CPA in the form of lower compensation.  This 
leads to a third alternative hypothesis: 
 
 9 
Alternative hypothesis 1d:  CPA will be negatively correlated with managerial 
compensation. 
 
2.2. Sample 
 
The foregoing hypotheses are tested on a sample consisting of data on the S&P 500 in the 
period 1998 through 2004.  For lobbying, the unit of observation is a firm-year, and the 
sample includes all firm-years in that period; for PAC activity, the unit of observation is a 
firm in a two-year election cycle (for example, 1997 and 1998, 1999 and 2000, etc.), 
using firm-year data for the second-year in the cycle, and the sample includes all election 
cycles in that period.  By construction, the sample consists of large publicly held firms 
and, as shown below (and reported in prior research), CPA correlates with firm size.  
Thus, the strength of the relationships reported below is likely to fall as one beyond this 
sample.
 
 However, prior research (for example, Drope and Hansen 2006) shows that the 
tendency of researchers to focus on larger firms does not seem to significantly bias the 
picture of CPA overall.  More importantly, the S&P 500 represents a large fraction of US 
public companies, corporate revenues and assets, and economic activity. 
 
2.3. Explanatory Variables:  Data on Corporate Governance   
 
In the analysis below, shareholder rights are measured in several ways.  Data on the most 
widespread measure – the G_INDEX from Gompers et al. 2003, which is based on 24 
corporate governance provisions tracked by IRRC (now RiskMetrics) and published in 
volumes dated 1998 through 2006 – are taken from IRRC via the WRDS website.11  
These data are available for all firms in the S&P 500 plus roughly 1,500 other firms 
deemed important by IRRC.  Data on the E_INDEX, which is described in Bebchuk et 
al. 2009 and is based on six provisions tracked by IRRC, is taken from Lucian Bebchuk’s 
website.
12
 Each of those indices is constructed of provisions that restrict shareholder 
power, so higher scores indicate less shareholder-friendly governance.  Following 
Gompers et al. 2003, I define ―Democracy‖ firms and ―Dictatorship‖ firms as having 
especially shareholder-friendly governance and especially bad governance, respectively, 
based on the extremes of the G-Index.  DEMOCRACY_G firms have G-Index score is 
five or lower, and DICTATORSHIP_G firms have G-Index scores of 14 or higher, 
while DEMOCRACY_E firms have E-Index scores of zero and DICTATORSHIP_E 
                                                 
11
 http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu. I have three G datasets: one from the Metrick website 
(http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859/data.html), which is based on IRRC publications; one from IRRC 
(now RiskMetrics) from the WRDS website; and one from Kim, who derived his data from the Metrick 
website.  For the S&P 500 sample, the datasets are nearly identical (correlation coefficients > .99), as one 
would hope, but they are not identical: there are a few (<35) mismatches between the ~1750 observations 
common to each pair of datasets.  The discrepancies range from 1 to 7, with means of ~2 (G ranges from 
2 to 16).  These discrepancies do not affect any results reported here.  I use the IRRC dataset because it is 
reported in WRDS for all years, although a review of the data shows that the dataset on WRDS has simply 
interpolated data for missing years – that is, every other year – from the prior year.  None of the qualitative 
results are affected by using only the years of IRRC publications. 
12
 http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml.  The E_INDEX is provided only for years 
covered by the IRRC publications – every other year – so I interpolate missing data from the prior year. 
None of the qualitative results are affected by using only the years of IRRC publications. 
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firms have E-Index scores of five or higher.  In addition, I use data on classified boards 
(C_BOARD_IRRC) from IRRC, via WRDS.
13
 
 
Ownership dispersion is measured by the logged number (LNCSHR) of record holders 
(CSHR) reported by a given company, as reported by Compustat.  The true item of 
interest is beneficial ownership, but data on the number of beneficial owners for most 
companies is not available, because the SEC does not require it to be disclosed, even 
though companies have the data.  Nevertheless, interviews with proxy solicitors confirm 
that the number of record owners is a noisy but correlated proxy for beneficial ownership, 
and in a separate paper (Coates 2010), I find that the number of record owners is 
correlated with a number of merger and acquisition practices (such as contract terms) 
with which theory suggests ownership dispersion should be correlated.   
 
Data on ownership of voting shares by insiders (that is, all officers and directors) 
(INSIDER_OWN) and 5+% owners (BLOCK_OWN) is taken from Dlugosz et al. 2004 
(for 1998 through 2001) and from the noisier CDA Spectrum database (for 2002 through 
2004).  CEO compensation is taken from Execucomp, via WRDS, also derived from 
annual proxy statements.  The measure used is the log (LOGTDC1) of total direct 
compensation (TDC), which includes cash and deferred compensation, including the 
Black-Scholes value of new option grants.  
 
2.4. Other Explanatory Variables 
 
In addition to the foregoing governance-related regressors, the models below include 
proxies customarily included in models of CPA, all drawn from prior research on CPA 
summarized above.  The key regressors are: 
 
 SALES (sales) and LNSALES (logged sales), EMPLOYEES (number of 
employees), and LOGEMP, serve as proxies for firm size and/or for the size of 
the pool from which a company may solicit donations to a corporate PAC, all 
from Compustat;  
 SALES3LS, the firm’s last three-year least-squares sales growth rate, using 
quarterly data, as a proxy for resources potentially available for CPA;  
 COMPANYAGE, the company’s age (since founding), from the Corporate 
Library (available primarily for years 2003 and 2004), with missing years 
interpolated, as a proxy for firm reputation or credibility;  
 FAMA, industry dummies using the Fama-French 1997 mapping of standard 
industrial classification codes to 48 categories;
14
  
 REG, a regulated-industry dummy for firms in regulated industries;15  
                                                 
13
 The Corporate Library also provides data on classified boards for the years 2001 to 2004, and I compare 
that data with IRRC, and find that they are nearly identical (correlation coefficient > .95), but again, not 
identical, with 42 mismatches out of 1811 observations in common.  Again, the discrepancies do not affect 
results for the subperiod of overlap between the datasets.   
14
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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 YEAR, annual dummies, to control for time trends;  
 C4, the four-firm concentration ratio for a firm’s industry (using 6-digit NAICS 
codes), as reported periodically by the Census Bureau,
16
 as a proxy for lower 
costs of political organization or potential benefits from lobbying against 
regulatory intervention; and, 
 GOVSHARE, the share of all government expenditures received by a firm’s 
industry, as reported periodically by the Census Bureau, as a proxy for potential 
benefits from lobbying. 
 
In addition, consistent with the corporate governance literature, firm value is 
approximated as the log of median-industry-adjusted book/price ratios (that is, ―Tobin’s 
Q,‖ see note 2 above, or RELQ).  For the industry adjustment, Fama’s 48-industry 
groups are used, and RELQ equals the log of the firm’s Q over the industry’s median Q.  
As in prior research, Q is defined as market value of assets over book value of assets, 
where market value of assets is approximated as the book value of assets plus the market 
value of common stock less the book value of common stock less the balance sheet value 
for deferred taxes).   
 
2.5. Dependent Variables:  Data on Corporate Political Activity 
 
Data on corporate PAC activity and lobbying activity from the ―Open Secrets‖ website,17 
which has a search engine and summaries of data from the Federal Election Commission 
(PAC contributions) and U.S. Senate (lobbying) websites, derived from Kim 2008.  Two 
variables measure the propensity of firms to engage in CPA:  LOBBY_YN is a dummy 
set to one if the firm participated in lobbying in a given year; CONTRIBUTE_YN is a 
dummy set to one if the firm’s PAC contributed in the prior two-year election cycle.  
Two variables measure the extent of participation:  LOBBYAMOUNT is the amount in 
$000s (and LOGLOB is logged amount) of annual lobbying expenditures by the firm 
(inflation-adjusted), CONTRIBUTEAMOUNT is the amount in $000s (and 
LOGCONTRIBUTE is the logged amount) of total PAC contributions sponsored by the 
firm to federal candidates over the prior two-year cycle (inflation-adjusted).  Each 
participation variable is the log of one plus, for non-zero observations, the observed 
value, to preserve zero observations in the sample.   
 
3. Summary Data 
 
Table 1 sets forth summary data (Panel A).   As can be seen, most of the S&P 500 is 
politically active, with 71% engaged in annual lobbying on average, and an average of 
70% sponsoring PACs that made donations in an election cycle.  For the S&P 500, 
consistent with prior research, the two types of CPA are complements: the correlation 
coefficient of lobbying activity and PAC contributions is 0.5, and the correlation among 
                                                                                                                                                 
15
 Regulated Fama 48-industries are 4 (alcohol), 5 (tobacco), 13 (drugs), 24 (aircraft), 26 (guns), 27 (gold), 
30 (oil), 31 (utilities), 32 (telecom), 40 (transportation), 44 (banks), 45 (insurance) and 47 (finance). 
16
 http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/concentration.html.  
17
 http://www.opensecrets.org. 
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lobbying and contribution amounts is 0.6.  S&P 500 firms spent roughly three times more 
on lobbying in a given year than their PACs give in an election cycle, or roughly six 
times more per year.  The distribution of both kinds of CPA is right-skewed (4.2 and 2.9) 
and kurtotic (29.6 and 23.6), and logged amounts are significantly closer to a distribution 
normal (skew of -0.3 and -0.6, kurtosis of 1.7 and 1.6).   
 
Summary statistics for G and E are comparable to those reported in Gompers et al. 2003 
and Bebchuk et al. 2009.  Roughly 60% of the S&P 500 had a classified board over the 
period, declining from 59% in 1998 to 57% in 2004, consistent with prior research.  In 
this large company sample, the median firm had 18,000 record shareholders, and only a 
few (between one and 15, depending on the year) had few enough record owners (<300) 
to be able to ―go dark‖ – that is, deregister with the SEC. Directors and officers own 6% 
of firm shares at the median; blockholders own 14%; CEOs are paid $6.5 million per at 
the median. 
 
4. Data Analysis 
 
4.1. Univariate Analysis:  Corporate Governance and CPA 
 
Table 2 sets forth the fraction of firms engaged in lobbying or PAC sponsorship and 
medians of expenditures and contributions, compares them for firms with different G- 
and E-INDEXes, and presents p-values for a simple one-way analysis of variance testing 
the null that CPA does not vary by G- or E-INDEX.
18
  Figure 1 charts the participation 
rates against the E-INDEX.  Firms with high G- and E-INDEX scores are much more 
likely to engage in CPA than firms with lower scores.  Roughly three-quarters of firms 
with a G-INDEX of 13 or more engage in lobbying, and 79% sponsor active PACs, 
contrasted with only 62% of firms with a G-INDEX of six or less that engage in 
lobbying, only 60% with active PACs.  The contrast between high- and low-E-INDEX 
firms is even stronger:  76% vs. 56% for lobbying, and 90% vs. 63% for PAC activity.  
The relationship between the indexes and CPA is not perfectly monotonic – across the 
mid-range of scores, CPA is either flat (for the E-INDEX) or it rises and falls somewhat 
(for the G-INDEX).  Nevertheless, the general slopes of the relationship between CPA 
and these measures of shareholder rights are clearly positive -- and since the indexes are 
higher for fewer shareholder rights, the relationship between CPA and shareholder rights 
is clearly negative. 
 
4.2. Regression Analysis: Corporate Governance and CPA 
 
Tables 3 through 6 set forth the regression results for CPA in the S&P 500.  Each table 
contains two panels.  Each top panel reports results for logistic models of participation in 
CPA – that is, whether a firm engages in any lobbying, or sponsors a PAC that made any 
contributions.  Each bottom panel reports results for ordinary lease squares models of the 
                                                 
18
 Similar analyses are not conducted here for the other corporate governance variables because they are all 
likely to be strongly affected by firm size and industry, so that simple univariate relationships would not be 
very meaningful.  In unreported analyses, the same qualitative relationships reported below in Tables 3 and 
4 are confirmed in ANOVA and/or ranksum tests. 
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extent of participation -- that is, models of the amount of lobbying expenditures or PAC 
contributions.  Tables 3 and 4 present models of lobbying.  Tables 5 and 6 present models 
of PAC contributions.  OLS is used for the expenditure and contribution models, rather 
than Heckman selection models, because there are no natural subsets of variables to omit 
to achieve identification, and because the inverse Mills ratio from unreported first-stage 
selection models for each type of participation that includes all regressors is, not 
surprisingly, highly correlated with the regressors in the second-stage spending models 
(in excess of 0.97 for G-INDEX, for example) (see note 8 above).   
 
Many of the corporate governance variables are highly correlated (see the correlation 
matrix in the Appendix).  Including all of them in a single regression could produce 
spurious results due to collinearity.  Thus, each corporate governance variable is first 
modeled on its own, and then on its own with a full set of non-governance variables from 
prior research, as well as industry and year dummies.  These results are presented in 
Tables 3 and 5.  Finally, each of the G-INDEX and E-INDEX is separately combined 
with INSIDER_OWN, and LNCSHR, with and without non-governance variables.  
TDC1 is not included because it lacks explanatory power in Tables 3 and 5, and because 
it is available for only a subset of the sample.  Likewise, even with interpolated data, 
COMPANYAGE is available for only subsets of the sample, and is added to the final 
model only. 
 
In the simple regressions without other explanatory variables (left half of Table 3), each 
of the corporate governance variables correlates strongly with lobbying propensity, 
except for the extreme anti-shareholder variables, DICTATOR-G and DICTATOR-E.  
Across the full-range of both the G- and E-INDEX, more shareholder rights is correlated 
with less lobbying, and classified boards with more lobbying.  When insiders or 
blockholders own more stock, their firms lobby less.  When shareholders are more 
dispersed, firms lobby more.  CEO compensation is higher in firms that lobby.   The 
same correlations are generally true of lobbying expenditures, although the E-INDEX 
(and its extremes) and classified boards are not statistically related to lobbying 
expenditures.   
 
When other explanatory variables are added (right half of Table 3), all of the results 
retain or increase their significance –in both economic and statistical terms.  Both G- and 
E-INDICES are strongly related to lobbying propensity, G remains strongly correlated 
with lobbying expenditures, and the E-INDEX – which had not been correlated on its 
own with lobbying expenditures – becomes statistically significant.  The only exceptions 
are INSIDERS_OWN, which falls in significance in the lobbying propensity regression, 
although it remains statistically and economically significant in the lobbying expenditure 
regressions, and the ―DICTATOR‖ firms – the firms with the weakest shareholder rights 
– which on their own do not differ strongly from other firms.  Firms with the strongest 
shareholder rights, however, are less likely to engage in lobbying, and engage in less of 
it.   
 
Not only are the corporate governance variables statistically related to CPA, but they are 
important.  In Table 4, three corporate governance variables on their own – either of the 
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G- or E-INDICES, INSIDERS-OWN and LNCSHR – generate pseudo-R-squareds and 
R-squareds of roughly 14% and 26% in models of lobbying propensity and lobbying 
expenditure regressions, roughly half of the goodness-of-fit statistics for the full models 
that include the variety of explanatory variables developed to date in the CPA literature.  
Collectively, corporate governance matters as much as other factors – such as firm size, 
industry concentration and regulation, and government purchasing.  The coefficients from 
moving from a G-INDEX of six (the 10
th
 percentile) to 13 (the 75
th
 percentile) in 
model (3) in Panel A of Table 4 would imply, holding everything else in the model 
constant at their sample averages, an increase in the odds ratio of lobbying by eight, and 
increasing ownership dispersion from the 10
th
 to the 90
th
 percentile would a further 
increase in the odds ratio of six, so that the odds of lobbying by a shareholder-friendly 
firm (at the 10
th
 percentile of each of those variables) would be fourteen times lower than 
for a shareholder-unfriendly firm.  Economically, corporate governance matters less to 
the amounts of lobbying expenditures than some other factors, such as firm size, but 
lobbying expenditures increase by 5% or more as one varies shareholder rights and 
ownership concentration, among otherwise similar firms. 
 
The story is much the same for PAC sponsorship and PAC contributions, except that 
CEO compensation appears to be less relevant.  The other governance variables have 
similar relationships with PAC activity as they do with lobbying and stronger 
relationships with PAC contribution levels than they do with lobbying expenditure levels.   
 
Contrary to alternative hypothesis 1d, managerial compensation is actually higher, not 
lower, at firms that actively engage in CPA.  Rather than serving as a fully compensated 
form of managerial perk, CPA appears to represent either an additional means by which 
shareholder value is diverted by managers already using their power to extra higher-than-
normal compensation, or it may function empirically as another proxy for poor corporate 
governance (recall that the other measures of corporate governance are highly noisy, at 
best, as proxies for shareholder power).  In unreported regressions, I find that indeed, 
LOGTDC1 is positively related to G-INDEX (and other measures of corporate 
governance).  If managerial compensation is subject to an upper bound, due (for 
example) to an ―outrage constraint‖ (Bebchuk and Fried), then CPA represents a second-
best way for managers of firms with weak shareholder rights to extract private value for 
themselves in a manner that is hard to observe or control.  (As noted below, unobservable 
political activity may represent another channel for managerial wealth extraction, one 
even more subject to abuse than the observable political activity modeled here.) 
 
4.3. Firm-Fixed Effects Regressions: Corporate Governance and CPA 
 
The robustness of the foregoing results could in theory be tested with firm fixed effects 
regressions, which would measure the relationship between changes in CPA at one firm 
as it changes its corporate governance.  While S&P 500 firms change their G-INDICES 
not infrequently,
19
 the changes are minor:  the median change in both indices is one; only 
                                                 
19
 Recall that in the observed values for the G- and E-INDICES change only every two years, because 
IRRC publications from which the data on which the indices were released only every other year.  Thus, 
the indices could change from the prior years only in years 2000, 2002 and 2004.  In those years, 36.5% of 
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10% of the changes in the G-INDEX are greater than two, amounting to only 3.7% of the 
observation years in which the indices could change; and only 5% of the changes in the 
E-INDEX are greater than one, amounting to only one percent of the observation years in 
which the indices could change.  Only two percent of sample firms change whether they 
have a classified board in those years.  The ownership dispersion and blockholder 
variables are also fairly stable for a given firm from year to year, with 64% and 55% of 
each variable changing by less than 1% on average per year.  
 
As a result, one should not expect that firm fixed effects regressions on corporate 
governance variables to produce powerful results, particularly if the most important 
differences among companies is not between those with marginally different values, but 
between firms at opposite extremes.  The weak power of such tests is compounded for 
models of PAC activity by the fact that such activity is observed only every other year, 
and for both lobbying and contribution participation because each dependent variable can 
only take on one of two values (0 or 1), limiting possible variation from year to year.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that fluctuation in CPA is an order of magnitude greater than 
fluctuation in corporate governance:  the median standard deviation of lobbying 
expenditures by firm over the sample period is 105, and the median lobbying expenditure 
is 166; the median standard deviation of the G-INDEX is 0.5, and the median G-INDEX 
is 10.  
 
If any of the corporate governance variables are likely to show strong relationships in a 
fixed effects setting, one would expect to see it where the average cross-sectional 
relationship between the G-INDEX and CPA are the strongest – at the breakpoint 
between DEMOCRACY-G firms and other firms.  An in fact, Table 7 shows that firm 
fixed effects regressions show a negative correlation between lobbying propensity, 
lobbying expenditures, and PAC contribution amounts, on the one hand, and 
DEMOCRACY-G, on the other hand, even after including other explanatory variables 
that vary within firms over the sample period – LNSALES, LOGEMPLOY and 
SALE3LS.  The other firm fixed effects relationships (not reported) are insignificant or 
sensitive to inclusion of other explanatory variables. 
 
4.4. Approximated Tobin’s Q and CPA 
 
Prior research has established that strong shareholder rights correlate with higher Tobin’s 
Q.  This paper has presented evidence that CPA correlates negatively with strong 
shareholder rights.  The question remains, is the former correlation mediated in part by 
CPA?  That is, does CPA correlate negatively with Tobin’s Q, and thus represent one of 
the channels through which corporate governance affects firm value?  Table 8 presents 
evidence that it does.   
 
Table 8 (Panel A) shows that a rough measure of firm value -- RELQ -- is higher for 
firms that do not engage in lobbying and for firms that do not sponsor PACs making 
                                                                                                                                                 
the firms experienced changes in their G-INDEX, consistent with a range of annual change of between 
18.3% and 36.5%, and 20.7% experienced changes in the E-INDEX, consistent with a range of annual 
change of between 10.3% and 20.7%.  
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contributions in the current year.  These findings hold after including the standard set of 
additional explanatory variables used in prior research, including the log of book value of 
assets, the log of company age, a dummy for Delaware incorporation, return on assets, 
three-year sales growth, capital expenditure intensity (capital expenditures over assets), 
research and development (R&D) intensity (equal to research and development 
expenditures to sales), dummies for missing R&D and ownership data, and annual 
dummies.  The regressions use robust standard errors, clustered by firm. 
 
In sum, not only does corporate political activity correlate with weak corporate 
governance, it also correlates (negatively) with firm value. Firms with corporate 
governance provisions giving shareholders more power engage in less political activity. 
Corporations that engage in political activity generate lower value for their shareholders 
relative to the value of the assets they control.   
 
The foregoing empirical analysis does not definitively prove that political activity harms 
shareholders (or, if shareholder anticipate the effect on firm value and pay lower prices 
for shares, harms entrepreneurs who face higher costs of capital).  But, given the 
complexity of the relationship between corporate governance and social welfare, and the 
difficulty of finding clean empirical tests of competing hypotheses on how governance 
structures work, such proof is never likely to be forthcoming, and policy must be built on 
a combination of theory and suggestive evidence.  In this respect, research on the effects 
of CPA – and the findings presented above – are no less reliable than the broader body of 
corporate governance research on the relationship between governance and firm value.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court relaxed the ability of corporations to spend money 
on elections, and in so doing, the Court rejected a shareholder-protection rationale for 
restrictions on spending.  This paper has explored the relationship between existing data 
on corporate governance and corporate political activity in the S&P 500 with the goal of 
predicting the effect of Citizens United on shareholder wealth, and of investigating 
whether there is evidence that corporate political activity could harm shareholder 
interests. The paper found that in the period 1998-2004 shareholder-friendly governance 
was consistently and strongly negatively related to observable political activity before 
and after controlling for established correlates of that activity, even in a firm fixed effects 
model.  Political activity, in turn, was found to be strongly negatively related to firm 
value.  These findings – together with the likelihood that unobservable political activity is 
even more harmful to shareholder interests – imply that laws that replace the shareholder 
protections removed by Citizens United would be valuable to shareholders. 
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Table 1.   
 
Summary Statistics 
     
S&P 500 Sample (1998-2004) 
 Mean or % positive Median St. dev. Min Max N 
LOBBY_YN 71.2 -- 45.3 0 1 3433 
CONTRIBUTE_YN 70.4 -- 45.6 0 1 1992 
LOBBYAMOUNT 958.3 167.4 1992.1 0 25772.5 3433 
CONTRIBUTEAMOUNT 237.4 54.1 476.1 0 4676.1 1992 
G-INDEX 9.6 10.0 2.5 2 16 3482 
E-INDEX 2.4 2.0 1.3 0 6 3078 
DEMOCRACY-G 5.1 -- 22.0 0 1 3482 
DICTATORSHIP_G 5.8 -- 23.3 0 1 3482 
DEMOCRACY-E 10.0 -- 30.0 0 1 3078 
DICTATORSHIP -E 4.2 -- 20.2 0 1 3078 
C_BOARD_IRRC 58.4 -- 49.3 0 1 3078 
CSHR 75.4 17.8 225.8 .001 4675.2 2863 
INSIDER_OWN 13.1 6.0 15.2 0 1 1863 
BLOCK_OWN 16.4 14.4 13.1 0 58.6 1782 
TDC 11116.4 6481.5 23688.3 0 734427.9 3360 
SALES 12651.9 5838.3 22735.9 36.5 286103.0 3458 
EMPLOYEES 43.9 19.0 84.5 0.1 1700 3377 
SALES3LS 14.7 8.2 35.7 -52.5 1028.2 3396 
COMPANYAGE 52.7 36.0 44.6 1 220 3314 
REG 35.5 -- 47.9 0 1 3486 
C4 39.6 35.6 19.5 1.5 98.9 3486 
GOVSHARE 6.3 3.1 9.5 0 91.5 3486 
RELQ 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.2 4.0 2203 
       
       
Notes.  Amounts in $000s or 000s.  LOBBYAMOUNT and CONTRIBUTEAMOUNT are inflation adjusted, using 
1998 as the base year. 
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Table 2. 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 
S&P 500 1998-2004 
  
G-INDEX 
 <7 7 8 9 10 11 12 13+ p-value of 
ANOVA 
LOBBY_YN (%) 61.7 62.4 64.3 68.4 78.4 82.6 72.1 74.7 0.0000 
LOBBYAMOUNT 146.6 64.1 109.0 121.0 201.0 321.0 135.5 154.5 0.0000 
N 418 306 440 465 485 505 358 454  
CONTRIBUTE_YN (%) 60.0 61.0 66.0 69.5 71.2 80.1 71.3 78.8 0.0000 
CONTRIBUTEAMOUNT 63.0 18.7 32.8 51.1 54.3 87.8 30.3 61.5 0.0045 
N 230 177 256 275 285 291 216 260  
  
E-INDEX 
 0 1 2 3 4 5+ p-value of 
ANOVA 
LOBBY_YN (%) 55.7 71.7 71.3 74.0 76.6 76.3 0.0000 
LOBBYAMOUNT 85.5 217.2 177.7 167.4 146.7 161.0 0.0000 
N 309 509 774 828 512 131  
CONTRIBUTE_YN (%) 63.0 70.9 67.7 72.2 76.2 89.6 0.0001 
CONTRIBUTEAMOUNT 81.3 59.6 51.9 51.3 43.0 69.1 0.0000 
N 173 292 458 486 298 77  
          
  
 
 24 
 
Table 3.   
 
Lobbying Regressions – Individual Corporate Governance (CG) Variables – S&P 500 Sample 
 
A. Lobbying Participation (Logistic)  
    
 
Explanatory 
variable 
 
Each CG variable on its own 
 Each CG on its own, 
plus other RHS variables 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Ps-R2 N  Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Ps-
R2 
N LR 
test 
G-INDEX 1.11 .000 .011 3431  1.15 .000 .321 2754 .0000 
E-INDEX 1.18 .000 .008 3063  1.30 .000 .317 2530 .0000 
C_BOARD 1.32 .001 .003 3063  1.47 .002 .310 2530 .0018 
INSIDERS_OWN 0.94 .000 .021 1856  0.41 .131 .308 1554 .1396 
BLOCK_OWN 0.97 .000 .012 1774  0.99 .029 .311 1628 .0219 
LNCSHR 1.75 .000 .036 2835  1.37 .000 .353 2309 .0000 
LOGTDC 1.26 .000 .036 3327  1.13 .037 .312 2746 .0152 
DEMOCRACY-G 0.44 .000 .016 3431  0.13 .000 .328 2754 .0000 
DEMOCRACY-E 0.45 .000 .004 3063  0.19 .000 .325 2530 .0000 
DICTATOR-G 0.90 .502 .006 3431  0.84 .426 .310 2754 .4553 
DICTATOR-E 1.29 .223 .009 3063  0.89 .637 .307 2530 .6749 
            
B. Lobbying Expenditures (Logged) (OLS) 
    
 
Explanatory 
variable 
 
Each CG variable on its own 
 Each CG on its own, plus other RHS 
variables 
Coef. p-
value 
R2 N  Coef. p-
value 
R2 N LR 
test 
G-INDEX 0.07 .002 .003 3431  0.10 .000 .539 2884 .0000 
E-INDEX 0.02 .720 .000 3063  0.19 .000 .550 2698 .0000 
C_BOARD -0.05 .680 .000 3063  0.22 .010 .546 2698 .0009 
INSIDERS_OWN -4.43 .000 .049 1856  -1.19 .007 .536 1686 .0006 
BLOCK_OWN -0.06 .000 .070 1774  -0.01 .007 .556 1753 .0002 
LNCSHR 0.84 .000 .240 2835  0.22 .000 .557 2439 .0000 
LOGTDC 0.51 .000 .039 3327  0.13 .002 .535 2876 .0004 
DEMOCRACY-G -0.64 .021 .002 3431  -1.21 .000 .540 2884 .0000 
DEMOCRACY-E -0.35 .117 .001 3063  -0.83 .000 .550 2698 .0000 
DICTATOR-G -0.40 .067 .001 3431  -0.19 .271 .533 2884 .2784 
DICTATOR-E -0.21 .368 .001 3063  -0.02 .937 .544 2698 .9420 
            
Notes.  All p-values reflect robust standard errors.  LR test reports the p-value of the likelihood ratio 
test, assuming that the reduced model (with other RHS variables alone) is nested inside the full model 
including relevant CG variable.  Results reported in ight half of each panel reflect other right-hand 
side variables not reported (LNSALES, LOGEMPLOY, SALES3LS, REG, C4 and GOVSHARE, as 
well as Fama 48-industry and yearly dummies). 
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Table 4.   
 
Lobbying Regressions – Combined Corporate Governance (CG) Variables – S&P 500 Sample 
 
A. Lobbying Participation (Logistic)  
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Explanatory variable 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
G-INDEX 1.10 .001   1.10 .014     
E-INDEX   1.22 .000   1.25 .003 1.28 .002 
INSIDERS_OWN 0.33 .005 0.35 .010 0.70 .578 0.92 .903 0.99 .996 
LNCSHR 1.74 .000 1.77 .000 1.37 .000 1.33 .000 1.33 .000 
LNSALES     6.23 .000 6.64 .000 6.82 .000 
LOGEMPLOY     0.39 .000 0.40 .000 0.38 .000 
SALES3LS     0.97 .000 0.97 .000 0.97 .000 
REG     2.77 .009 2.92 .009 2.88 .018 
C4     1.01 .058 1.01 .062 1.01 .053 
GOVSHARE     1.01 .608 1.01 .068 1.00 .938 
COMPANYAGE         1.01 .031 
           
Fama 48-Industry 
dummies? 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies? 
 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 1529 1474 1192 1119 1087 
Pseudo-R-sq 0.143 0.145 0.318 0.312 0.316 
            
B. Lobbying Expenditures (Logged) (OLS) 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Explanatory variable 
Coef. p-
value 
Coef. p-
value 
Coef. p-
value 
Coef. p-
value 
Coef. p-
value 
G-INDEX 0.05 .060   0.08 .003     
E-INDEX   0.06 .231   0.17 .000 0.19 .000 
INSIDERS_OWN -2.01 .000 -2.06 .000 -0.81 .083 -0.64 .000 -0.43 .371 
LNCSHR 0.85 .000 0.86 .000 0.21 .000 0.19 .001 0.17 .002 
LNSALES     1.70 .000 1.70 .000 1.78 .000 
LOGEMPLOY     -0.54 .000 -0.48 .002 -0.54 .000 
SALES3LS     -0.02 .000 -0.02 .000 -0.02 .000 
REG     0.83 .003 0.80 .005 0.95 .001 
C4     0.02 .000 0.02 .000 0.02 .000 
GOVSHARE     0.02 .054 0.14 .070 0.01 .278 
COMPANYAGE         0.01 .000 
           
Fama 48-Industry 
dummies? 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies? 
 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 1529 1474 1419 1370 1314 
R-sq 0.262 0.262 0.559 0.564 0.573 
           
Notes.  All p-values reflect robust standard errors. 
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Table 5.   
 
PAC Regressions – Individual Corporate Governance (CG) Variables – S&P 500 Sample 
 
A. Corporate PAC Participation (Logistic)  
    
 
Explanatory 
variable 
 
Each CG variable on its own 
 Each CG on its own, 
plus other RHS variables 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Ps-R2 N  Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Ps-
R2 
N LR 
test 
G-INDEX 1.12 .000 .013 1990  1.17 .000 .365 1515 .0000 
E-INDEX 1.18 .000 .008 1784  1.28 .000 .367 1442 .0001 
C_BOARD 1.49 .000 .001 1784  1.76 .001 .364 1442 .0007 
INSIDERS_OWN 0.30 .007 .001 942  0.37 .253 .359 789 .2550 
BLOCK_OWN 0.97 .000 .003 877  0.98 .078 .359 699 .0740 
LNCSHR 1.77 .000 .139 1610  1.27 .001 .323 1181 .0004 
LOGTDC 1.24 .000 .012 1896  1.06 .421 .353 1511 .3289 
DEMOCRACY-G 0.59 .013 .003 1990  0.20 .000 .361 1515 .0000 
DEMOCRACY-E 0.65 .011 .003 1784  0.60 .072 .360 1442 .0721 
DICTATOR-G 1.16 .493 .000 1990  1.01 .982 .352 1515 .9841 
DICTATOR-E 3.60 .001 .001 1784  2.07 .067 .360 1442 .0779 
            
B. Corporate PAC Contributions (Logged) (OLS) 
    
 
Explanatory 
variable 
 
Each CG variable on its own 
 Each CG on its own, plus other RHS 
variables 
Coef. p-
value 
R2 N  Coef. p-
value 
R2 N LR 
test 
G-INDEX 0.21 .000 .009 1990  0.25 .000 .485 1613 .0000 
E-INDEX 0.21 .000 .003 1784  0.40 .000 .489 1531 .0000 
C_BOARD 0.66 .013 .013 1784  1.01 .000 .487 1531 .0009 
INSIDERS_OWN -3.40 .005 .009 942  -0.97 .409 .475 836 .4042 
BLOCK_OWN -0.08 .000 .045 877  -0.02 .080 .514 864 .0542 
LNCSHR 1.42 .000 .219 1610  0.38 .001 .476 1352 .0001 
LOGTDC 0.71 .000 .025 1896  0.02 .853 .475 1609 .8064 
DEMOCRACY-G -0.66 .315 .001 1990  -1.50 .001 .478 1613 .0015 
DEMOCRACY-E -0.53 .277 .001 1990  -0.88 .020 .482 1531 .0014 
DICTATOR-G 0.30 .556 .001 1784  0.23 .584 .474 1613 .5995 
DICTATOR-E 1.68 .000 .004 1784  1.34 .002 .482 1531 .0095 
            
Notes.  All p-values reflect robust standard errors.  LR test reports the p-value of the likelihood ratio 
test, assuming that the reduced model (with other RHS variables alone) is nested inside the full model 
including relevant CG variable.  Results reported in ight half of each panel reflect other right-hand 
side variables not reported (LNSALES, LOGEMPLOY, SALES3LS, REG, C4 and GOVSHARE, as 
well as Fama 48-industry and yearly dummies). 
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Table 6.   
 
PAC Regressions – Combined Corporate Governance (CG) Variables – S&P 500 Sample 
 
A. Corporate PAC Participation (Logistic)  
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Explanatory variable 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
Odds 
ratio 
p-
value 
G-INDEX 1.13 .003   1.19 .002     
E-INDEX   1.34 .000   1.49 .000 1.53 .000 
INSIDERS_OWN 1.21 .745 1.47 .517 1.08 .932 1.44 .700 1.83 .6533 
LNCSHR 1.86 .000 1.36 .000 1.32 .008 1.28 .016 1.29 .011 
LNSALES     5.16 .000 5.07 .000 5.30 .000 
LOGEMPLOY     0.47 .008 0.52 .013 0.51 .012 
SALES3LS     0.99 .754 0.99 .823 1.00 .980 
REG     3.21 .039 3.29 .031 3.10 .049 
C4     1.01 .168 1.01 .166 1.01 .107 
GOVSHARE     0.98 .164 0.99 .284 0.98 .182 
COMPANYAGE         1.00 .761 
           
Fama 48-Industry 
dummies? 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies? 
 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 752 741 591 582 565 
Pseudo-R-sq 0.154 0.145 0.347 0.357 0.361 
            
B. Corporate PAC Contributions (Logged) (OLS) 
    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Explanatory variable 
Coef. p-
value 
Coef. p-
value 
Coef. p-
value 
Coef. p-
value 
Coef. p-
value 
G-INDEX 0.23 .005   0.31 .000     
E-INDEX   0.48 .000   0.62 .000 0.67 .000 
INSIDERS_OWN 0.79 .516 1.04 .387 0.57 .669 0.89 .494 -1.34 .317 
LNCSHR 1.57 .000 2.11 .000 0.44 .009 0.41 .015 0.41 .014 
LNSALES     3.03 .000 3.05 .000 3.15 .000 
LOGEMPLOY     -1.29 .000 -1.16 .001 -1.21 .001 
SALES3LS     -0.01 .294 -0.01 .284 -0.01 .342 
REG     1.22 .067 1.23 .072 1.29 .068 
C4     0.02 .043 0.02 .033 0.03 .016 
GOVSHARE     -0.15 .575 -0.01 .713 -0.23 .421 
COMPANYAGE         0.00 .337 
           
Fama 48-Industry 
dummies? 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies? 
 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 752 741 591 681 654 
R-sq 0.239 0.243 0.503 0.511 0.517 
           
Notes.  All p-values reflect robust standard errors. 
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Table 7.   
 
Firm Fixed Effects Regressions – DEMOCRACY-G and Political Activity 
 
A. Lobbying Participation (Logistic)  
    
 
Explanatory variable 
 
With firm fixed effects 
 With other RHS variables,  
plus firm fixed effects 
Coef. p-
value 
N  Firms  Coef. p-value N  Firms 
DEMOCRACY-G -2.26 .005 986 143  -1.93 .051 954 142 
            
B. Lobbying Expenditures (Logged) (OLS) 
    
 
Explanatory variable 
 
With firm fixed effects 
 With other RHS variables,  
plus firm fixed effects 
Coef. p-value N  Firms  Coef. p-value R2 N 
DEMOCRACY-G -0.64 .000 3431 498  -0.51 .006 3303 496 
           
C. PAC Contributions (Logged) (OLS) 
          
 
Explanatory variable 
 
 
With firm fixed effects 
 With other RHS variables,  
plus firm fixed effects  
Coef. p-value N  Firms  Coef. p-value N  Firms 
         
DEMOCRACY-G -1.23 .010 1990 498  -1.18 .016 1879 496 
            
Notes.  All p-values reflect robust standard errors. Results reported in right half of each panel reflect other right-
hand side variables not reported (LNSALES, LOGEMPLOY, and SALES3LS, as defined in the text). 
 
 
Table 8.   
 
Political Activity and Firm Value 
 
Industry-Adjusted Tobin’s Q (OLS) 
    
 
Explanatory variable 
 
Each explanatory variable on its own 
 Each explanatory variable separately, with 
other RHS variables 
Coef. p-
value 
R-
squared 
N   Coef. p-value R-
squared 
N  
LOBBY_YN -0.22 .000 0.03 2187  -0.14 .020 .163 1632 
CONTRIBUTE_YN -0.19 .001 0.02 1077  -0.11 .066 .142 798 
            
            
Notes.  All models are OLS with median-industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable, defined as 
described in the text.  All p-values reflect robust standard errors, clustered by firm. Results reported in right half 
of each panel reflect other right-hand side variables not reported (log book value of assets, log of company age, 
dummy for Delaware incorporation, return on assets, three-year sales growth, capital expenditure / assets, R&D / 
sales, and a dummy for missing R&D data.   
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Appendix 
 
Correlation Matrix for Corporate Governance Variables 
 
 G-INDEX E-INDEX  COARD INSIDER-OWN BLOCK-OWN LNCSHR 
E_INDEX 0.7109      
CBOARD_IRRC 0.5476 0.6513     
INSIDERS_OWN -0.0435 -0.0662 -0.0506    
BLOCK_OWN 0.0167 0.0271 -0.0266 0.5363   
LNCSHR 0.0035 -0.0546 -0.0033 -0.3073 -0.3387  
LOGTDC1 -0.0334 -0.0776 -0.0505 -0.0143 -0.1009 0.1392 
 
 
